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The aim of this article is to present socio-cultural processes of doing gender catego-
ries in women with intellectual disabilities and to identify barriers and limitations 
which they face on the way of „becoming women”. 
The study and its analysis are based on the critical approach. 
The method of data collection was a participant observation conducted during 
three proprietary workshops on femininity organized for 17 women with moderate 
to severe intellectual disabilities (5–6 people in a group), attending an occupational 
therapy workshop. The aim of our workshops was the empowerment of one’s own 
femininity and strengthening of processes of doing gender by the participants. 
The analysis of collected material revealed that the process of shaping gender 
identities of women with intellectual disability is a subject of social control of the 
local community. Participants of the workshops are well aware that they are adult 
women and they strive for the realization of cultural patterns of femininity. In their 
case, however, these patterns are socially regulated and the women themselves 
internalize certain limitations imposed by the society during the socialization pro-
cess. They instinctively “know” what they are allowed to do, and what they cannot 
gain as women with intellectual disabilities. 
KEY WORDS: woman, intellectual disability, (un)doing gender, femininity, work-
shops, critical approach 
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Introduction 
The subject of the analysis presented herein comprises processes 
of doing gender by women with intellectual disability, or rather 
barriers and limitations encountered by them in “becoming wo-
men”. This issue remains, in principle, outside the area of interests of 
disability researchers. In scientific publications, usually only “a stu-
dent”, “a graduate”, “an adult”, “an employee” etc. or “a person” 
with intellectual disability is discussed as if they functioned in  
a utopian post-gender world, where gender no longer has any 
meaning. Perhaps, the researchers rather assume that other topics 
are more important and urgent to discuss than common, obvious 
issues of gender. We adopt a different position, in compliance with 
which, we understand gender as a social institution1 and a structure 
of social relations.2 “Personal identities, patterns of gendered embod-
iment, intimate contacts – all of these »close-up« experiential issues, 
which are usually the topic of discussion on gender – are constituted 
in the structure of gendered relations. This structure always compris-
es men and women and assumes different forms of masculinity and 
femininity”.3 Those patterns are adopted, reproduced and negotiat-
ed/transformed in social relations, where individuals and groups 
function.4 Furthermore, the quoted author explains that “gender 
refers to the manner in which the society copes with the human 
body and the reproduction process, as well as numerous conse-
quences of this »coping« in our personal and social life”.5 
______________ 
1 J. Lorber, Believing is Seeing: Biology as Ideology, “Gender and Society”, 1993,  
no. 7(4), pp. 568–581. 
2 R. Connell, Advancing Gender Reform in Large-scale Organizations: A New Ap-
proach for Practitioners and Researchers, “Policy and Society” 2005, no. 24(4), pp. 5–24. 
3 R. Connell, Advancing Gender Reform in Large-scale Organizations: A New  
Approach for Practitioners and Researchers, “Policy and Society” 2005, no. 24(4), p. 6. 
4 R. Connell, Gender: In World Perspective (Socjologia płci. Płeć w ujęciu globalnym), 
transl. O. Siara, PWN, Warsaw 2013, p. 30. 
5 R. Connell, Gender: In World Perspective (Socjologia płci. Płeć w ujęciu globalnym), 
transl. O. Siara, PWN, Warsaw 2013, p. 31. 
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In the further part of the text we would like to present, how 
gender “works” as a social structure in the case of women with in-
tellectual disability, that is, how it shapes (including: how it blocks) 
their functioning, as well as how it is perceived and doing by them. 
We believe, similarly to, Connell, that gender is multidimensional, 
liquid and can be produced by us in various ways, e.g. depending 
on the social context. We will present our considerations on the 
grounds of the data collected during three educational workshops 
with participation of women with intellectual disability. However, 
first of all, we will briefly explain the concept, which is key for our 
considerations. 
Gender as regulatory fiction – the theoretical basis  
of the analysis 
The concept of doing gender6 is usually explained as recreating 
by women the dominant model of femininity (and model of mascu-
linity by men), in compliance with social expectations, however, as 
if it was a natural phenomenon not requiring thought or specific 
skills (here: gender competences7). The reality is different; becoming 
and then, “being” a woman (or a man) is a process in which the 
individual becomes engaged as soon as they are born and which 
continues throughout their life. 
Many people believe that roles of women and men are not so-
cially played, but rather biologically conditioned and therefore, 
universal, obvious and ahistorical. Biology, which only as of the end 
of the 19th century “has explained” gender differences8, as a science 
______________ 
6 Cf. C. West, D.H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, “Gender and Society” 1987,  
no. 1(2), pp. 125–151. 
7 R. Connell, Gender: In World Perspective (Socjologia płci. Płeć w ujęciu global-
nym), transl. O. Siara, PWN, Warsaw 2013, p. 170. 
8 Previously, this issue was discussed mainly by theologists, according to whom 
“God created a man and a woman for different purposes”. Therefore, first, social 
inequalities constituted the adopted effect of the “Divine Law”, and when “biologi-
cal differences between women and men were recognised as a scientific fact (…), 
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is perceived, not only by laypersons, as functioning above suspicion 
of any bias; it is believed to be an axiom that it simply describes 
natural facts. Nevertheless, as noticed by, among others, Judith 
Lorber, “Western ideology treats biology as the cause and the social 
behaviour and positions as the effect, then, it constructs biological 
dichotomies to justify »naturalness« of gendered behaviours and 
gendered social statuses. Thus, we believe what we see: two sexes 
produce two genders. However, this process happens inversely: the 
gender constructs social bodies so that they are different and une-
qual”9. Critical reflections presented by Lorber or e.g. Richard 
Lewontin (1996) lead to the observation that such binary under-
standing of the issue of sex (female/male) and gender (wom-
en/men) is an arbitrary procedure that remains in contrast to both, 
biological10, as well as socio-cultural reality. 
Despite popularised scientific discoveries and anthropological 
analyses, people still, in majority thoughtlessly, refer to the strongly 
rooted in the western culture belief that gender is a derivative of sex 
that “its meanings inscribed in anatomically diversified bodies are 
characterised with a certain determinism, whereas, the bodies only 
passively wait for the implacable law to work”.11 The quoted author 
______________ 
[then,] all attempts at objection against (…) discrimination of women [proved to be] 
a violation of the »laws of nature«” (M. Kimmel, The Gendered Society (Społeczeństwo 
genderowe), transl. A. Kłonkowska, GWP, Gdansk 2015, pp. 42–43). 
9 J. Lorber, Believing is Seeing: Biology as Ideology, “Gender and Society”, 1993, 
no. 7(4), p. 568. The fact that the language of biology is biased was proved by many 
authors, among others, Emily Martin, who, on the grounds of the analysis of ways 
of describing oocyte and sperm in academic textbooks, demonstrated that the lan-
guage of the scientific – seemingly neutral – description is soaked with gender ste-
reotypes (cf. E. Martin, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance 
Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles. (Jajo i plemnik. Naukowy romans), transl.  
J. Włodarczyk, [in:] „Gender. Perspektywa antropologiczna”, ed. R. Hryciuk, A. Koś-
ciańska, Warsaw 2007.). 
10 E.g. M. Kimmel, The Gendered Society (Społeczeństwo genderowe), transl. A. Kłon-
kowska, GWP, Gdansk 2015, pp. 41–88. 
11 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 54. 
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underlines that this customary manner of understanding gender 
constitutes a function of the discourse, which “is based on binary 
structures, which appear as the language of universal rationality”. 
The fact that, until recently we could not imagine that there are 
more than two sexes or two genders (or that we still feel resistance 
thereto) results from the limitations, which are “already built-in in 
the notion of cultural sphere of gender allowed by language”.12 The 
seemingly obvious observation that sex is binary (which is sup-
posed to be proved by primary sex features) leads to the conclusion 
that “»men« are (…) an addition to biologically male bodies or that 
»women« constitute an interpretation of solely female bodies”.13 
Therefore, for many it can be even more difficult to accept the fol-
lowing analytical conclusion: that “sex is always defined as gen-
der”.14 However, the author accurately explains which measures 
and tools are used so that the “apparatus of production and estab-
lishing sex”15 works effectively and thus, invisibly. She indicates, 
among others, the binarism underlining the discursive ordering of 
the world, including the establishment of apparent opposites: 
strong will – determinism, mind/soul – body, culture – nature, 
gender – sex, etc. The relation in this dichotomous system to some 
extent assumes that one element constitutes a reverse of the other, 
therefore, if one results from intentional intervention, the other  
exists independently of social action, is more primary. Stability of 
the biological construction of sex is guaranteed by inscribing it in 
______________ 
12 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 56. 
13 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 51. 
14 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 55. 
15 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani 
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 52. 
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the pre-discourse sphere and, therefore, in consequence, people 
come to believe that it is natural, inalienable and gender constitutes 
a specific opposite thereto.16 The power apparatus blurring traces of 
discursive creation of such feeling constitutes the “comprehensibil-
ity matrix”, which defines sex as “substance, being identical as self”, 
whereas, it hides the fact that “»being« sex or gender if fundamen-
tally impossible”.17 Nevertheless, the majority of us thoughtlessly 
state that we are “a woman/feminine” (or “a man/masculine”), not 
noticing in this gesture the limiting activity of hegemonic discourse 
using the binary regulation of sexuality.18 Effectiveness of the dis-
course is reinforced with the presence of other fundamental belief in 
our culture: concerning the substantial, psychological person (“real, 
inner Me”). This person is “disclosed” in the statement “I am  
a woman” (“I am a man”) expressing the wish to be a causative 
subject (i.e. “being a cause for own thoughts”) and simultaneously 
transforming “fictitious wholes, which at the beginning had only 
linguistic reality” in substance.19 And thus, there is a significant 
shift in discourse, which leads to the conclusion that “a person is  
a gender in culture and that it is so due to own sex, mental feeling 
of self and various manners of expressing own psychological »me«, 
out of which the most noticeable is sexual desire”.20 
______________ 
16 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 53. 
17 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, pp. 70–71. 
18 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 71. 
19 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, pp. 74–75. 
20 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 76. 
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A cultural requirement that all of us are subjected to (and which 
we are negotiating or trying to oppose) constitutes having a stable, 
unequivocal and, preferably, “correspondent” to our sex, identity 
(including: gender identity). In psychology – e.g. in Erik Erikson’s 
conception21 – it is assumed that an individual in their development 
process should undertake the task of self-formation (i.e. of own 
identity) at the relatively early stage, i.e. in the adolescence period, 
at approx. 16 years old. Currently, this task, as many other previ-
ously limiting adulthood, is postponed in time (memorandum), yet, 
still the majority of people lack the awareness that the “postulate of 
identity is a cultural limitation – a principle introducing order and 
hierarchy, in short: regulatory fiction”.22 “Women” and “men” con-
tinue to be understood as permanent substances, yet, this “substan-
tial effect of gender is performatively created and becomes obligato-
ry by regulatory practices of its coherence. (…) [G]ender is always 
an activity, however, not the activity of an individual that would 
proceed their action”.23 In short, the author of the Gender Trouble 
(Uwikłani w płeć) states: “Gender constitutes a repeated body stylisa-
tion, a collection of acts repeated in exceptionally rigid regulatory 
framework, which solidify with time, creating an appearance of 
substance, an appearance of a certain type of natural being”.24 
Biological features of women and men considered as key and 
varied in quality, for many centuries enabled unequivocal classifica-
tion of people to one of two separate social categories. In contempo-
rary Western societies this mechanism “gets stuck”, since ideologi-
______________ 
21 E. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle (Tożsamość a cykl życia), transl.  
M. Żywicki, Zysk i S-ka, Poznan 2004, pp. 84–90. 
22 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 79. 
23 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 80. 
24 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 94. 
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cal beliefs legitimising its functioning are disclosed, discussed and 
questioned, as well as various subversive practices with regard to 
the heteronormative order are undertaken. More and more people 
come across journalistic debates and scientific considerations re-
garding, whether gender is achieved, done and (in various ways) 
implemented and not “authoritatively” assigned. It seems that 
nowadays, gender is more and more often perceived as “a task to 
perform”, or rather a manner to express inner Me, or desirable styli-
sation of own body. 
The explanations referred above should help us present the 
phenomenon of performative gender creation, i.e. the activity of 
regulatory fiction constituting gender with regard to persons, who 
are often excluded from population of “real women” or function at 
its margin. 
Methodology 
The main objective of our research, as has already been men-
tioned, constituted the analysis of the phenomenon of doing gender 
(creating gender identity), in which women with intellectual disa-
bility are engaged. The research was situated in a critical paradigm. 
In compliance with the critical approach, the researcher’s task is to 
uncover linguistic violence and hidden power relations. Women 
with intellectual disability encounter numerous limitations in the 
process of creating gender identity or even rejection in this regard 
from their environment. In this text we want to answer the question, 
how, in the case of women with intellectual disability, the process of 
socialising to gender roles attributed to females occurs or does not 
occur. Therefore, we will strive to identify moments when the 
mechanism of regulatory fiction usually acting through “the unam-
biguity of sex, internal cultural coherence of gender and binary 
frameworks of sex and gender”25 is “stuck”. 
______________ 
25 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity (Uwikłani  
w płeć. Feminizm i polityka tożsamości), transl. K. Krasuska, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 
Warsaw 2008, p. 94. 
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The presented research has been conducted during educational 
workshops aimed at supporting the process of empowering partici-
pants – women with more severe intellectual disability. While estab-
lishing the organisation of workshops, we conducted several focus 
interviews to distinguish areas important for adult women with 
intellectual disability26. One of the conclusions from conducted fo-
cuses, which we would like to refer here, harmonised with findings 
of our researchers and it concerned numerous barriers blocking 
emancipatory efforts undertaken by persons with intellectual disa-
bility.27 Moreover, a category of gender as “an element” repeated 
many times during interviews was also strongly distinguished in 
our results. As a result of conducted analyses, gender proved to be  
a meta-issue entering into “interactions” with each distinguished 
topic. Therefore, the interviews implied that the research partici-
pants, despite considering themselves as females, are not deemed as 
real women in the social context and experience many limitations in 
performing life roles typical for women. Due to recognising one of 
the most arduous and unclear for the focus interviewees’ difficul-
ties, we decided to devote the educational workshops to the issue of 
femininity and thus, the identity, which they “aspire” to achieve. 
To conduct the workshop (in three different groups) we had in-
vited a professional with many years of experience in working with 
persons with intellectual disability, a psychologist, supported em-
ployment coach, who proprietarily selected methods and detailed 
contents to the topic stipulated beforehand. Our participation in  
the workshop consisted in observing (participant observation) and 
registering its course, however, we sometimes helped participants if 
______________ 
26 B. Cytowska, E. Zierkiewicz, Conversations about health – sharing the personal 
experiences of women with intellectual disabilities, “Journal of Applied Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities”), 2020. 
27 Cf. B. Cytowska, Difficult Ways of Adaptation. Emancipation Themes in the Anal-
ysis of the Situation of Adults with Intellectual Disabilities in the Contemporary Polish 
Society. (Trudne drogi adaptacji. Wątki emancypacyjne w analizie sytuacji dorosłych osób  
z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną we współczesnym społeczeństwie polskim), Oficyna 
Wydawnicza „Impuls”, Kraków 2012. 
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directly requested e.g. in drawing a picture they came up with or 
writing down a specific phrase on paper. 
The workshop was participated by a total of 17 women with 
more severe intellectual disability aged 24–48 years old (3 groups of 
5–6 persons), living in various environments and attending two 
Lower Silesian Occupational Therapy Workshops. 
Each workshop lasted approx. 3–4 hours with half-an-hour 
break. Participation was voluntary and all participants had been 
asked individually, if they agreed to being recorded during work-
shops. Furthermore, all women had been ensured that the infor-
mation would be used anonymously and the information identifying 
them would be omitted. Moreover, we agreed that at any moment 
of the project they could resign from participation in classes. 
After completion, each workshop was described in details and 
statements given by the trainer and participants were transcribed. 
Workshops for women with intellectual disability as social 
space for community definition of female identity 
In compliance with our assumptions, the process of constructing 
gender identity has a relational character and is executed with spe-
cific social activities and practices, in which the entity, in the given 
context, engages (and is engaged). Our position is contrary to the 
still popular belief that femininity is a highly abstract concept cate-
gory, which can be understood solely by achieving a specific level 
of cognitive development (i.e. formal thinking exceeding the con-
crete and experience, characterised with the ability to generalise, 
deduct and conclude).28 Moreover, understanding own femininity 
would supposedly naturally stem from the “inside” of the individual, 
who, by achieving a specific level of maturity, can disclose and  
express this truth about oneself. In reality, since birth we participate 
______________ 
28 Cf. J. Piaget, Inhelder B., The Psychology of the Child (Psychologia dziecka), transl. 
Z. Zakrzewska, Siedmioróg, Wroclaw 1996, p. 120. 
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in processes of doing gender and we acquire certain gender compe-
tences quite early, which allow us to find ourselves in the world 
popularised by, so to say, two separate groups: women and men. 
Such dichotomous thinking of gender is still widespread in 
common believes and intensively supported by media images, and 
even scientific works, e.g. psychological.29 Of course, there are many 
more social powers pressuring the individual to “properly” create 
their gender identity. Additionally, persons with intellectual disa-
bility are pressured to “create disability”, that is, impose on them 
specific beliefs regarding their ability and various, presumably pro-
tective, limitations. Analysis of the material collected during work-
shops allowed noticing three of such pressures, which were dis-
closed in the approach, believes and behaviours of the psychologist 
conducting the workshop, as the person organising and ordering 
the social space of the meeting and representing the institutional 
power. By indicating the phenomenon of “forming” objects of activ-
ity in compliance with the previously adopted vision, we do not 
want to criticise the person conducting the workshop, who com-
pleted the training task very well, but to draw attention to the fact 
that taking a certain role (here: the teacher, the trainer of the group, 
the organiser of the workshop etc.) entails unconsciously exercising 
certain pressures related to the functioning of given regimes, among 
others, institutional and gender. Noticing this entanglement is ex-
tremely difficult. 
Therefore, first of all, our analysis disclosed the meaning of the 
trainer’s believes on cognitive and emotional functioning of partici-
pants of classes as persons with intellectual disability. These be-
lieves were not communicated directly but were manifested with  
a surprise at a lack of expected reactivity of participants of the first 
workshop and by changes introduced in exercises with two follow-
ing groups. Secondly, the source of pressure also consisted in the 
professional experience of the trainer establishing her believes. 
Years of professional work enable workers to establish and main-
______________ 
29 Cf. R. Connell, Gender: In World Perspective (Socjologia płci. Płeć w ujęciu glob-
alnym), transl. O. Siara, PWN, Warsaw 2013, p. 110 and next. 
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tain contact with supported persons, but, at the same time, result in 
the former internalising norms and rules of the institution, which 
they later enforce from the latter. The third type of pressure dis-
closed in the analysis should be connected with the topic of work-
shops, i.e. defining femininity and undertaking actions with regard 
to biographical gender designs.30 
The psychologist conducting the workshop quite quickly gained 
“an idea” regarding cognitive abilities and limitations of partici-
pants of the first workshop (she familiarised herself with this group 
effectively, since she knew some of those persons earlier and she 
met them in her work). As, at the beginning her questions regarding 
who a woman is and what femininity is were not elaborated on by 
the participants, the trainer did not go into reasons for silence and 
she reached for props: dialogue cards presenting females often in 
unreal or symbolic manner (e.g. as a matryoshka, with a house on 
the head, with butterflies on the head, with a teddy bear in the  
belly). The exercise to which women had been invited, consisted in 
selecting one image from a pack of 30 cards and describing it to  
a colleague sitting next to them. Work in pairs was also welcomed 
quite reluctantly, therefore, the trainer changed the form of the ex-
ercise to work in a group. She asked participants to present their 
card to the others and explain their choice; to facilitate the task, the 
participants were asked to answer the question, what they liked 
about the picture (or what they did not like). Yet another time the 
trainer faced resistance from the group; this time, a little smaller. As 
it seems, participants started to get accustomed to the situation and 
undertook the task describing elements observed in the image to 
others. They mainly used simple, very precise terms, such as:  
“I have a lady dancing on water and she dances like this, moves her 
leg and hand like this. Here, she has a dress, here she has a scarf 
tied, here she has shoes and I like that she is dancing nicely”. Other 
constructed this statement: “I see a woman leaning, she is watching 
something”, without giving reasons for selecting the card. “I can 
______________ 
30 R. Connell, Gender: In World Perspective (Socjologia płci. Płeć w ujęciu globalnym), 
transl. O. Siara, PWN, Warsaw 2013, p. 172. 
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try… But I do not know, what to say. She has something on her 
head, I do not know, a castle. (…) Because I liked this card. Because 
she has something on her head, she holds something”. 
 
Photo no. 1 
The trainer did not comment behaviours and statements made 
by participants, she did not lecture them; she tried to adjust to them 
(or rather to her interpretation of their intellectual and social abili-
ties at a given moment). However, it seems she assumed that the 
proposed exercises are too difficult for women and they showed  
a low level of language constructions and complete misunderstand-
ing of symbolism in the pictures, since in two consecutive workshop 
groups the trainer changed the use of cards significantly. In the 
modified task, the participants could, instead of forming own opin-
ions, use definitions signed on prepared cards (photo no. 1). The 
majority of studied individuals participating in all three workshops 
could read and those who did not manage with reading were 
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helped by the trainer, who gave them several propositions to choose 
from. Some of those were metaphorical or abstract, yet, women 
matched them to the selected card correctly. 
The first exercise in unmodified version (group 1) and in modi-
fied version (groups 2 and 3) – allowed participants to get used to 
the unusual situation, relax and engage in further parts of the work-
shop. Women showed openness, they expressed their opinions 
more willingly and, if they did not hear or understand the request, 
they were not afraid to ask for repetition or explanation. They also 
started helping each other or asked the psychologist for support. In 
that way e.g. new terms were learned or less frequently used terms 
were repeated, such as: subtlety, fulfilment, passion, concentration, 
longing and similar concepts were differentiated: love and infatua-
tion, admiration and joy. 
After this part of workshops, the trainer asked all participants 
what they understand by femininity. The manner of giving answers 
varied: persons from group 1 who did not have hints in a form of 
cards with ready statements, used descriptive phrases, where prac-
tices and gendered activities were underlined: “A woman is preg-
nant”, “She has to feed, she has boobs”, “Put make-up on, get 
dressed”, “Taking care of personal hygiene”, “Dying hair”, “Paint-
ing nails”, “Puts lipstick on”, “A woman wears earrings”, “She is in 
love”, “Yes, she loves her man”. Apart from the above, the partici-
pants recalled associations with appearance, indicating the process 
of “creating” feminine image with the use of various cosmetics (re-
lated to makeup). It could be stated that their statements to some 
extent indicated the beautification regime domineering in culture, 
as the “natural capital” of women (gender capital, aesthetic capi-
tal31), and simultaneously “deciphering” that femininity is a kind of 
disguise32, or, as we have already written, it is “doing” in repeated 
behaviours, stylised gestures etc. 
______________ 
31 See. K. Huppatz, Reworking Bourdieu’s ‘Capital’: Feminine and Female Capitals in 
the Field of Paid Caring Work, “Sociology” 2009, no. 43(1). 
32 Womanliness as Masquerade by J. Riviere, cf. as cited in: G. Gajewska, Masquer-
ade of Gender, that is, Non-woman Pretending to be a Woman (Maskarada płci, czyli nie-
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In contact with two other groups, where the trainer decided to 
interfere in the group work to “improve” it, a significant phenome-
non of relative construction of femininity and “helpful” use of regu-
latory fiction is observed. Participants from groups 2 and 3 in their 
statements on the meaning of the concept of femininity did not use 
phrases referring to social performance, but to psychological, inter-
nal “nature” of women. These definitions (and depictions) became 
available to them by: a) previously prepared cards with terms refer-
ring to personality-related feminine features, b) vocabulary sug-
gested to them during the exercise by the trainer, and c) by own 
agreements made during the group discussion. Therefore, mainly 
two dimensions of gender regime appeared in the conversations 
held by participants of groups 2 and 3, called by Connell the dimen-
sion of emotions and human relations33 (e.g. indicating that women 
are characterised with sensitivity, protectiveness) and the dimen-
sion of gender ideology (here: mainly the roles “assigned” to wom-
en: a mother and a wife). 
Biological, but not cultural determinism?  
Social limitations of the possibility to “implement” gender 
identity by women with intellectual disability 
As we have already mentioned, the majority of people do not re-
flect deeply on the essence of gender identity and mechanisms of 
creating it. It is still commonly believed that gender roles and gen-
der result directly from primary sex features: female or male genita-
lia (unambiguous cases, e.g. androgyny, are “invalidated” surgically). 
Sex is considered to be primary and unequivocal. However, this 
common sense approach to women and men is difficult in use, since 
______________ 
kobieta udająca kobietę), “Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica” 2017, no. 18(2), 
p. 59. 
33 R. Connell, Advancing Gender Reform in Large-scale Organizations: A New  
Approach for Practitioners and Researchers, “Policy and Society” 2005. 
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we meet nude persons in social situations extremely rarely – and 
only in this way we can state their sex. Therefore, every day we 
“identify” others only on the grounds of their appearance and be-
haviour, which can result in misunderstandings in contacts with 
them.34 Avoiding social faux pas, difficulties or more serious prob-
lems (resulting from e.g. social ostracism due to the non-adherence 
to gender norms), people usually send quite clear signals regarding 
sex, which has been assigned to them and/or with which they iden-
tify. In the direct and indirect, via media, living environment of 
contemporary people, since early childhood they are presented with 
ideal and, much less frequently, alternative models of gender be-
haviours, which they should copy. Expectations regarding fulfil-
ment of relevant roles (or rather roles corresponding with their sex) 
are being constantly formulated etc. 
The process of doing gender happens to some extent unnoticed 
or not fully consciously and, in majority of cases it happens effi-
ciently and effectively. Trajectories of gender development cease to 
proceed collision-free, among others, when gender designs are not 
or cannot be coherent with the model of femininity (or masculinity) 
available in the culture.35 Admittedly, in the contemporary world 
we do observe relaxation of gender regimes and individualisation 
of the approach to construct gender identities, however, this  
case extremely rarely concerns persons with intellectual disability. 
What is interesting, those are the persons who are at the disposal of 
a considerable “subversive potential” exceeding narrow and rigid 
models of femininity (or masculinity). However, the use of this  
“arsenal” by persons with intellectual disability is objected by basi-
cally all of their social environment: parents, carers, teachers, peda-
gogues, psychologists, friends, neighbours and others. Therefore, 
they are subjected to intensified and very special social control 
______________ 
34 M. Kimmel, The Gendered Society (Społeczeństwo genderowe), transl. A. Kłon-
kowska, GWP, Gdansk 2015, pp. 168–169. 
35 R. Connell, Gender: In World Perspective (Socjologia płci. Płeć w ujęciu globalnym), 
transl. O. Siara, PWN, Warsaw 2013, p. 172. 
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aimed at (and resulting from) doing gender in compliance with  
their sex and simultaneously limiting or hindering it, that is, undoing 
gender. 
Women with intellectual disability are identified by, among  
others, medical personnel or own parents, as women, because they 
have female genitalia. Thus, they are socialised and brought up in 
compliance with the binding model of femininity, however, they are 
more often and more intensively than their typical peers subjected 
to control interventions, presented to them as undertaken for their 
own good, for their safety, hygiene and care. Whereas, such treat-
ments above all violate their privacy and intimacy, infringe their 
individual rights (including to experience their sexuality), biological 
functions of their bodies are subjected to stigmatism and embar-
rassment. In consequence, thus repressed individuals, despite their 
bodies biologically maturing, almost never, in social sense, become 
adult women (i.e. their environment still often does not give them 
such status); they do not “receive” the right to enter into relations 
with intimate partners (the more so, to get married and start fami-
lies), the right to make life choices independently and often, even to 
purchase basic clothes (they receive T-shirts, bras or even under-
pants from their mothers). And despite the fact that majority of 
them are not legally incapacitated, to some extent they are socially 
and politically made a non-person (dependent, non-adult, irrespon-
sible) – culturally disabled. Paradoxically, or rather contrary to the 
assurances made by the environment (among others, parents) such 
hindrance or blocking (in social and political context) gender identi-
ty implementation and limiting it to physiological and sexual func-
tions of body (especially, to the “nuisance” with menstruation, 
“danger” of getting pregnant, “horror” of starting sexual life) is 
executed due to the interest of all of the other persons apart from 
the woman with intellectual disability. 
We refer to the important and uncomfortable for many social 
entities, issue, since it shows how complex the matter of creating 
gender by persons with intellectual disability is. The physiological 
aspect of their functioning is so deeply “naturalised” that they be-
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come to some extent “biology of their organism”, that is, females, 
who – for many never – should not become cultural individuals: 
women. What for typical persons is only a starting point, for them is 
to be the ending point. Of course, it is not possible to implement 
such dystopian postulate, therefore, women with intellectual disa-
bility have a considerate subversive potential, as they create other, 
different, exceptional, marginal, alternative etc. gender identities 
significantly different from the dominant model and thus, they 
show that this model is only a certain cultural construction and not 
a biological and cultural destiny of each female. 
The objective of our workshops was to start a conversation with 
women with intellectual disability on the topic of their possibilities 
in doing gender and mutually explore factors blocking such pro-
cesses. Therefore, the next task proposed by the trainer consisted in, 
generally speaking, the participants situating themselves as a wom-
an in social reality and more accurately: in social roles. 
The psychologist asked women from group 1 to draw them-
selves and then to draw persons with whom they have close rela-
tions and at the end to write their characteristic features in the 
drawing (persons who had difficulties with writing dictated the text 
to the trainer). This task was not successfully completed by the 
group; one woman refused drawing, the other wanted to destroy 
the picture, because she was not happy with it (“I look like  
a tramp”), and the other stated that it did not look like she wanted, 
although, after a moment she found similarity to her mother in the 
self-portrait. While observing drawing women, one paradoxical 
phenomenon was noticed: on the one hand, they were in general 
happy with the drawing; however, on the other hand, in various 
ways, they expressed disappointment with the results or rather, 
they communicated dislike to themselves and low self-esteem. This 
situation is only seemingly contradictory and atypical. In fact,  
a majority of women do not accept their appearance; cultural ideals 
of feminine beauty are very difficult to achieve and in comparison 
to such models one should refer while assessing own image. Parti- 
cipants of this training expressed these cultural mandates they regu-
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larly come across in the mass media and not only. To some extent, 
they even played with this dissatisfaction, as if they performed for 
themselves and their friends. 
 
Photo no. 2 
Despite undertaking the activity of drawing, the subjects from 
group 1 did not want to talk about themselves or to write down 
their characteristic features, therefore, the person conducting the 
workshop had to change this formula and proposed that the partic-
ipants wrote down attributes admired and appreciated in their col-
leagues in the group (photo no. 2). This task was performed by the 
participants more willingly. They described their colleagues only 
with positive features: “she is polite, cheerful”, “she is smiling, 
laughing”, “kind”, “nice”, “she is pretty”, “lovely”, “she is a good 
colleague”, “a woman”, “friendly”. When features enumerated by 
their colleagues were read out, the described participants were visi-
bly happy – they had been openly appreciated. 
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Photo no. 3 
In remaining groups (2 and 3) the trainer changed this task as 
well to a mutual drawing of a picture of one woman (!) and creating 
her biography: who she is, how old she is, what her profession and 
hobby is, whom she has close relations with (photo no. 3). This 
modified idea was again, as believed by the trainer, successful (she 
did not introduce any modifications in group 3). Participants of 
group 2 and 3 performed the task with more enthusiasm than their 
colleagues. They were daydreaming about the imagined woman 
and, what is interesting, they used several terms that they had 
learned (or remembered) during previous exercise regarding defin-
ing femininity. 
To sum up, it is worth underlining that participants from group 1, 
directed by the trainer, described each other as persons making  
a friendly impression, easy in contact. At that, they referred or even 
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turned directly to the particular person. They did not refer to the 
category of femininity as key to characterise themselves or their 
social relations. The situation was completely different in groups 2 
and 3, where a story was made up about an imagined, single female 
as if symbolising the whole population of women. This type of exer-
cise reinforces the gender regime and refers to certain perceptions 
concerning social expectations formulated with regard to women. 
However, participants of both groups evidently used their own re-
sources, therefore, doctors appear among important persons with 
whom they have relations. “Facilitating” or perhaps “enabling” work 
with workshops’ participants, the trainer clearly directed them to 
cultural socialisation strategies and reinforced gender regimes. 
Summary 
When a child is born, in common perception, in fact, a girl (future 
woman) or a boy (future man) is born. From the very beginning, par-
ents and other persons from the child’s environment undertake ac-
tions that will create proper, in terms of gender, environment, among 
others, they buy specific toys (dolls or cars), they dress her/him in 
clothes adjusted to sex (skirts or trousers), pay attention that thy use 
proper grammatical forms, as well as daydream with the child about 
his/her adult life: occupation, family (of course, heterosexual) and 
children that will be born from this relationship: a girl or a boy. The 
whole process is smooth and almost unnoticed, however, only if 
“everything is fine” the child, or rather it is able to adjust to the ex-
isting normative order. However, if the child is “different” e.g. ho-
mosexual, transgender or has intellectual disability, this process 
“gets stuck” and is distorted and particular stages of socialisation 
are not automatic, they are even blocked by carers as undesirable. 
Special “others” do not have social consent to, among others, get 
married and have children (and if the latter happens, then, as in the 
case of women with intellectual disability, children are taken from 
them and given up for adoption). They are not allowed to routinely 
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undergo the “natural” social process; nevertheless, they do undergo 
this process, yet, differently. Thus, their presence in the society dis-
closes existence of the cultural socialisation mechanism, which results 
in effectively engaging social entities in “gender doing” processes 
and therefore, in responding to the call to embody and internalise 
gender norms. Nevertheless, it seems that in majority, carers of per-
sons with intellectual disability concentrate so much on controlling 
their behaviours or desires that they do not notice the potential of 
persons under their care, which is revolutionary with regard to the 
social order. Besides, it is not something desirable for them and for 
the whole environment. However, they cannot allow to completely 
ban their disabled children from forming gender identity, since our 
whole life is lived within the gender system, which operates through 
images, language, relations, behaviour, appearance etc. 
At the same time, in the case of women with intellectual disabil-
ity, being recognised as women is often an aspirational objective 
they link with adulthood, freedom of choice, independence and full 
rights. However, due to considering them as persons with intellec-
tual disability they are refused to “be” (“real”) women. Therefore, 
usually, they acquire only a certain scope of gender competences, so 
as to make it possible to recognise, where the social barrier between 
“being” a woman and “being” a disabled (woman) was set. Para-
doxically, our workshops allowed disclosing both of these processes: 
doing gender in compliance with the dominant models of feminini-
ty, which was actively participated by the psychologist conducting 
the training and undoing gender, which constituted participants’ 
response to reaching the invisible barrier separating them from im-
plementing the call imposed on (almost) all women. 
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